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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that in seeking an
injunction against Disney's further use of the songs, Bourne was
required to initially demonstrate irreparable harm. Although irreparable harm is presumed when a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case of copyright infringement, the court stated that it is equally
settled that a party's delay in the enforcement of copyrights rebuts
that presumption. The court held that Disney's use of the songs
for several decades and Bourne's failure to object to the violations
of its claimed contractual rights demonstrated a lack of urgency for
preliminary relief. Because Bourne failed to establish the existence
of irreparable harm, the circuit court held that Bourne was not entitled to an injunction and reversed the judgment of the district
court.
-J.B.K.
COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC. V. PROFESSIONAL REAL

944 F.2D 1525 (9TH CIR. 1991), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 1557 (1992).

ESTATE INVESTORS, INC.,

A group of California movie studios brought a copyright infringement action against hotel operators (PRE), challenging the
operators' rental of video discs to hotel guests to watch in their
hotel suites. PRE filed antitrust counterclaims against the movie
studios, alleging that the copyright infringement suit was a sham
brought with the intent to monopolize and restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The United States District Court for the
Central District of California granted summary judgment to the
hotel operators (PRE) on the infringement claim, and this was affirmed on appeal. However, the same district court entered summary judgment in favor of the movie studios on the antitrust counterclaim, and PRE appealed, alleging:
(1)the court focused only on the lawsuit and failed to consider
PRE's other allegations of anticompetitive conduct;
(2)the copyright infringement action was a sham, thus the studios have no immunity from antitrust liability under the NoerrPennington doctrine;
(3)the court should have permitted PRE additional discovery to
prove that he copyright lawsuit was a sham; and,
(4)the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the pendent state law claims when it dismissed PRE's counterclaim.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's entry of summary judgment for the studios on the antitrust
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counterclaim. They found that the studios did not refuse to deal
when they rejected PRE's offer of settlement, and this refusal to
settle afforded no basis for antitrust liability. The court held that
PRE failed to demonstrate any injury resulting from the alleged
antitrust activity, and that in order to waive Noerr-Pennington immunity, PRE had to show that the original lawsuit was legally
baseless before looking at any subjective intent to perpetuate anticompetitive conduct on the part of Columbia. The court went on
to find that Columbia's copyright suit, although unsuccessful, was
brought with probable cause, and that a suit brought with probable cause did not fall within the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Thus, the court found no need for further discovery on the part of PRE to determine the studios' subjective intent,
because the first prong of the immunity waiver test, involving
baseless claims, was not met. According to the court, PRE was not
prejudiced by bringing up the pendent state law claims in California state courts, because the state court tolls the statute of limitations period during the time a suit is pending in federal court.
Thus, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, and its decision was affirmed in all aspects.
-C.L.

McNEIL v.

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE,
(D.MINN. 1992).

790 F. Supp. 871

Plaintiffs, eight professional football players whose National
Football League contracts expired, filed antitrust claims against
the National Football League (NFL) and the NFL team owners
under section I of the Sherman Act seeking an injunction to permanently bar the NFL and the NFL team owners from implementing certain proposals under "Plan B". In 1988, the NFL presented
to the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) a
proposal, entitled "Plan B", to enter a new system of player restraints. Under "Plan B", the NFL proposed, inter alia, to eliminate all contract negotiations with the individual football players
and establish a league-wide wage scale. By eliminating competition
among the different NFL teams, plaintiffs claim that the proposed
wage scale is violative of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Both parties
brought various motions before the district court.
First, the district court denied the players' motion for a permanent injunction based on testimony that the NFL, although already having implemented certain other proposals under "Plan B",
had no immediate intention of implementing the league-wide wage
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